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Criminal Law and Procedure-
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Robert E. Kendrick*
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I. SuBsTANTI E CivrmaiL LAw
1. Offenses Against the Person-(a) Homicide.-The American states
have generally codified in one form or other the common law "felony-
*Assistant General Counsel, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.; member,
Tennessee Bar. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of the Department of Commerce.
CRIMINAL LAW
murder rule" to the effect that homicide committed while perpetrating
or attempting a felony, and as a consequence thereof, is murder.1
Tennessee's statute in this regard,2 which largely follows the most
widely adopted version of the rule in limiting it to specified felonies
and in classifying homicides committed in connection therewith as
first degree murder,3 was applied in two cases decided by the state
supreme court during the survey period.4
In Smith v. State,5 the court found that the defendant had entered
a store, demanded money of the store's proprietor, and drawn a gun
to facilitate his purposes; that the proprietor had responded by getting
a gun and snapping it at the defendant; and that the defendant in turn
had shot to death the proprietor. The defendant's conviction of
murder in the first degree under the statutory felony-murder provision
was affirmed. The court held that the only defense seriously advanced,
self-defense, was not available to him, citing a New York decision6
holding that one who kills another while engaged in committing a
felony cannot escape conviction of murder in the first degree by
showing his intent was not to kill but to defend his own life or person.
This seems to be a correct interpretation and application of the rule
under the circumstances. By embarking upon a felony which common
experience indicates involves substantial human risk, the felon hazards
the guilt of murder from loss of life caused by the risk he created.7
The defendant in the Smith case tried to bring his situation under
the accepted principles that the mere coincidence of felony and
homicide is insufficient; rather it is necessary to show causation, that
"death ensued in consequence of the felony," to make the felony-
murder rule applicable. He argued that the homicide was not com-
mitted in pursuance of the robbery but collateral to it. The court
rejected this contention, holding that the killing had a sufficiently close
connection with the attempt to commit robbery. This conclusion, too,
1. The common law background of the doctrine is sketched in MoRELAND, HoMIcDE
14, 42-48 (1952); and a rather complete categorization, by states, of statutory
variations of it is given in the same source. Id. at 217-25.
2. "Every murder . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
any murder in the first degree, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or larceny, is murder
in the first degree." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (1956).
3. However, the Tennessee statute adds to the usual list of specified felonies of
violence and great danger (arson, rape, robbery, and burglary) the not-as-dangerous
felony of larceny, and, uniquely, murder in the first degree. MoRE_AND, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 217, 219.
4. Previous felony-murder decisions include: Sims v. State, 348 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn.
1961); Farmer v. State, 201 Tenn. 107, 296 S.W.2d 879 (1956); Mullendore v. State,
183 Tenn. 53, 191 S.W.2d 149 (1945); Sullivan v. State, 173 Tenn. 475, 121 S.W.2d
535 (1938); Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S.W.2d 843 (1932).
5. 354 S.W.2d 450 (Tenn. 1961).
6. Cox v. People, 19 Hun 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879), aff'd, 80 N.Y. 500 (1880).
7. PsmuuNs, CwmwAL LAW 34 (1957).
8. Id. at 35.
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follows the general judicial attitude that the felon is responsible for
the consequences flowing from the cone of violence created by his
deliberate commission of the felony, and the fact that the victim of
the felony attempted to protect himself and thereby immediately
brought on his own death at the hands of the felon is not an interven-
ing agency such as will interrupt the causal relationship.9
The court also invoked the felony-murder rule in Dupes v. State'0
in affirming the first degree murder conviction of defendant Dupes,
one of three defendants found to have conspired to rob a certain
individual, who was shot and killed by another of the defendants in
the course of the robbery while Dupes waited nearby in an automobile
for the return of his co-conspirators. It was held that when the three
defendants entered upon a common design to commit a felony, the
natural and probable consequences of which involved the contingency
of taking human life, all were responsible for the acts of each com-
mitted in furtherance of the design, though such acts were not speci-
fically contemplated and even though Dupes did not personally
commit the act that killed. This was nothing more than applying
the law of parties that an accessory before the fact or a principal
in the second degree is liable for the commission of a crime different
from the one instigated or agreed upon if the crime committed was
likely to be caused by such instigation.' Dupes was a principal in the
second degree by being present, albeit constructively, when a felony
was being committed and by aiding and abetting its commission
through situating himself so as to be able to aid his associates, with
a view, known to them, to insure success in the accomplishment of
their common enterprise.13 Thus, at common law he was equally
guilty and subject to the same punishment as was the principal in
the first degree who actually fired the shot that killed the robbery
victim;14 and by statute he was an aider and abettor deemed a prin-
cipal offender and punishable as such.15 The felony-murder rule,
therefore, was just as applicable to Dupes as if he had been the
principal in the first degree.
9. 1 WHARTON, CmIMIN AL LAW AND PRocEDnuRE § 252 (Anderson ed. 1957); People
v. Perry, 14 Cal. 2d 387, 94 P.2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 1123 (1939); Aikin v. Common-
wealth, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 523, 68 S.W. 849 (1902).
10. 354 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. 1962).
11. The court cited Williams v. State, 164 Tenn. 562, 51 S.W.2d 482 (1932), Irvine
v. State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 S.W. 845 (1900), and Moody v. State, 46 Tenn. 299
(1869).
12. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 50,69 (1956).
13. Cr. Ax & MARsmkLL, CrnMEs 449-50 (6th ed. 1958).
14. Id. at 461.
15. "All persons present, aiding and abetting, or ready and consenting to aid and
abet, in any criminal offense, shall be deemed principal offenders, and punished as
such." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-109 (1956).
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Bostick v. State'6 raised again the question of voluntary intoxication
as a defense in a homicide prosecution. There, the supreme court
affirmed a judgment of conviction of involuntary manslaughter under
a murder indictment in spite of (a) testimony by law enforcement
officers and a physician who had seen the defendant immediately after
she had committed the homicide that she was drunk, (b) a finding
by the supreme court that she "had been upon a continuous and
prolonged drunk,"17 and (c) her own testimony that she had been
drinking and could not remember what happened. The court said
that "it is well settled that voluntary drunkenness is no mitigation of
crime, except where specific intent, or deliberation and premeditation
is an essential ingredient of the offense; and such drunkenness is no
excuse or defense to a finding of murder in the second degree or
lesser included offenses." 8 It is probably generally true throughout
Anglo-American jurisdictions that voluntary drunkenness is not a valid
defense to the crime of manslaughter 9 and that a conviction of man-
slaughter under circumstances similar to those in the instant case
would therefore normally be affirmed in such jurisdictions.'m It is
difficult to justify, however, the court's dictum that voluntary drunken-
ness is not a defense to murder in the second degree, in view of the
requirement of malice as an essential ingredient of murder, whatever
the degree, and the fact that intoxication, even if voluntary, may be
of such character and degree as to render the mind incapable of
malice.2'
2. Offenses Against the Habitation- (a) Burglary.-The require-
ment of common law burglary that the offense be committed in the
"nighttime" came to be interpreted as referring to that period after
sunset one day and before sunrise the next day when there is not
enough daylight to permit the discernment of the countenance of a
human being.22 Trentham v. Stateas presented the question of whether
16. 360 S.W.2d 472 (Tenn. 1962).
17. Id. at 476.
18. Id. at 476, citing Harper v. State, 206 Tenn. 509, 334 S.W.2d 933 (1960);
Lewis v. State, 202 Tenn. 328, 304 S.W.2d 322 (1957); Walden v. State, 178 Tenn.
71, 156 S.W.2d 385 (1941).
19. WrjArms, CncNA.L LA-w § 182 (2d ed. 1961).
20. Professor Jerome Hall contends that one whose previous experience forewarns
him that he will probably become intoxicated if he drinks and that he is dangerous
when intoxicated acts recklessly when he drinks intoxicating liquor and is therefore
guilty of manslaughter if he kills a human being while grossly intoxicated. Conversely,
he argues persuasively that one who has not had such prior experience and who com-
mits harms while grossly intoxicated should not be punished for them, inasmuch as
the principle of mens tea limits penal liability to normal persons who intentionally or
recklessly commit harms forbidden by penal law. HAI , Gmmaqr PuCIPLES OF
CnmntINL LA W 556-57 (2d ed. 1960).
21. For a fuller discussion on this point, see Kendrick, Criminal Law and Procedure-
1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VA-D. L. REv. 1220, 1220-23 (1961).
22. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTr~AMEs *224; Paus, op. cit. supra note 7, at 165.
23. 358 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1962).
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proof that defendant's activities took place during the "evening" was
sufficient concerning the nighttime requirement to support a convic-
tion of burglary in the first degree. The supreme court held that it
was, "evening" in common speech being understood to include the
early part of night or from after supper until the usual bedtime.24
Section 39-906 of the Tennessee Code Annotated reads as follows:
Any person who, with intent to commit crime, breaks and enters, either by
day or by night, any building, whether inhabited or not, and opens or
attempts to open any vault, safe, or other secure place by use of nitro-
glycerine, dynamite, gunpowder, or any other explosive, shall be deemed
guilty of burglary with explosives. Any person duly convicted of burglary
with explosives shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less
than twenty-five (25) years nor more than forty (40) years.
Section 39-904, concerning "burglary in the third degree," provides
in a paragraph enacted subsequent to the enactment of section 39-906
as follows:
Any person who, with intent to commit crime, breaks and enters, either by
day or by night, any buildings, whether inhabited or not, and opens or
attempts to open any vault, safe, or other secure place by any means, shall
be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than three (3) nor
more than twenty-one (21) years.
State ex rel. Wooten v. Bomar25 presented the court with a problem
in statutory construction. With a "safe-cracking" burglary statute
already on the books (39-906), specifying as a means the use of
explosives, did the subsequent enactment of another "safe-cracking"
burglary statute (amended 39-904), not specifying particular means
but rather "by any means," and providing less severe penalties than
the previously existing statute, repeal the first statute? The answer
to this question was very important to the plaintiff in error in the
Wooten case, because he had been convicted of burglary with ex-
plosives, allegedly occurring in 1957, and sentenced to twenty-five
years imprisonment under section 39-906,26 after the enactment in
1955 of amended section 39-904. Although he had apparently over-
looked raising the problem in the original trial and appeal, he had
now petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had
been indicted and convicted under a statute that had at the time been
impliedly repealed by the legislature and therefore was now being
held without lawful authority by the warden in the state penitentiary.
24. The court cited Golay v. Stoddard, 60 Idaho 168, 89 P.2d 1002 (1939) and
State ex rel. Martin v. Foley, 89 Vt. 193, 94 AUt. 841 (1915).
25. 352 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. 1961).
26. Wooten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 314 S.W.2d 1 (1958).
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If his theory was correct, of course, the jurisdictional question was a
proper subject of inquiry by habeas corpus at any time.27
The conclusions reached by the supreme court in its decision on the
Wooten appeal from denial of the petition below and on petition to
rehear were that, in the code chapter entitled "Burglary," the state
legislature had at various times (as it had a right to do) caused to be
placed a series of sections creating a number of degrees of burglary;
the classification was (as it should be) natural, not arbitrary, and
made with reference to the heinousness of the crimes and not to
disconnected matters; the legislature had in section 39-906 treated
burglary with explosives, in view of the particular danger therefrom
to human life, as done under the most aggravating circumstance
under which burglary could be committed and, in line with other
states, had imposed for it the most severe penalties of any form of
burglary; in section 39-904 a different class or degree of burglary,
burglary in the third degree, had been created with less severe
penalties; the 1955 amendment to section 39-904 does not refer nor
relate to the previously enacted more serious offense of burglary with
explosives; and "an examination of the House Journals, etc."2 shows
that the 1955 enactment was merely an amendment to the definition
and penalty for burglary in the third degree in section 39-904 and was
limited in its application to that section. The court, on the basis of
these conclusions, found that "there could not in our judgment be any
implied repeal of the heinous crime by an amendment to the statute
covering a lesser crime."-
Probably the court in the Wooten case correctly interpreted the
legislative intent behind the two statutes in question; but the Criminal
Code, most of all the parts of the state code, should be clear in its
provisions. With little revision any doubt could, and should, be here
removed.
3. Offenses Against Property-(a) Larceny.-The Tennessee Code
provides that grand larceny consists of taking and carrying away
personal goods having a value in excess of $100, and petit larceny,
of goods having a value of not more than $100;30 it provides more
severe penalties for grand larceny.31 If D, with an intent to steal, on
several different occasions trespassorily takes and carries away X's
personal property, the value of which on no one occasion amounts to
as much as $100 but altogether amounts to more than $100, is D
guilty of grand larceny or a series of petit larcenies? The first reported
case raising this question in Tennessee was a fraudulent breach of
27. 5 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, § 2225.
28. 352 S.W.2d at 7.
29. Id. at 8.
30. TEN. CODE ANN. § 39-4203 (Supp. 1962).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4204 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4205 (Supp. 1962).
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trust prosecution wherein the court in 1960 adopted the following
general rule: If each taking is the result of a separate independent
impulse or intent, it is a separate crime; but if the "successive takings
are actuated by a single, continuing, criminal impulse or intent or are
pursuant to the execution of a general larcenous scheme . . . such
successive takings constitute a single larceny regardless of the extent
of time which may have elapsed between each taking."3
Miller v. State, decided during the survey period, is the first re-
ported Tennessee case presenting the question stated in the preceding
paragraph, in a strict larceny context. There, the defendant confessed
to having stolen from his employer at various times drug tablets (re-
ferred to as "Bennies") in most instances in bottles of 1,000 tablets
each, which the evidence showed had a fair market value at the time
of $7.00 per bottle. There was evidence that the tablets were taken
in July, September, November, and December of 1957. Defendant
in his confession also stated that shortly after he went to work for his
employer in April, 1957, he was approached by an individual who
offered to pay him $15 per thousand for the tablets, and that subse-
quently he delivered 92,000 tablets to that individual, and 12,000 to
another individual, getting them from his employer's plant-each time
one of the two individuals got in touch with him with a request for
more tablets. Law enforcement officers found a total of 27,000 of the
tablets in the possession of one, and 46,000 in the possession of the
other, of defendant's two "customers." On this evidence, the supreme
court concluded that the taking of the tablets for sale as needed was
pursuant to the execution of a general larcenous scheme; it accordingly
affirmed a conviction for grand larceny.
(b) Robbery.3
(c) Receiving Stolen Property.Y5-In Tennessee the elements of the
offense of receiving or concealing stolen goods are specified by
statute to be: (a) fraudulently receiving, buying, concealing, or aiding
in concealing, (b) goods feloniously taken or stolen from another, or
goods obtained by robbery or burglary, (c) knowing such goods to
32. Nelson v. State, 208 Tenn. 179, 183, 344 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1960), quoting from
Annot., 136 A.L.R. 948, 950 (1942). The general attitude of American courts is
reflected in a New York decision involving an individual who over a period of years
had stolen thousands of dollars in nickels from subway turnstiles at a rate of about
$25 a day, for which he was convicted of grand larceny (over $100). Said the court:
"Logic and reason join with all the authorities that have considered the question, in
holding that the people may prosecute for a single crime a defendant who, pursuant
to a single intent and one general fraudulent plan, steals in the aggregate as a felon
and not as a petty thief." People v. Cox, 286 N.Y. 137, 145, 36 N.E.2d 84, 87 (1941).
33. 358 S.W.2d 324 (Tenn. 1962).
34. See discussion concerning Mowery v. State, 352 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1961),
infra, p. 724-26.
35. Instructive on the general subject of receiving stolen property is HLALL, THElTr,
LAw, AND Socry 155-232 (2d ed. 1952).
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have been so obtained, (d) with intent to deprive the true owner
thereof.1
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Powell v. State,37 affirmed a con-
viction for receiving and concealing stolen property on finding, con-
trary to the defendant's contention, that there was evidence of
receiving and concealing in addition to that of theft, while recognizing
authoritym that such a conviction would be invalid if the only evi-
dence was of theft. The court noted evidence that the defendant had
been arrested while driving an automobile occupied by himself and
an associate, without knowledge by the automobile's owner that the
automobile had been taken; that the automobile at that time was
"hot wired" (wires being run from one part of the automobile to
another so that it would operate without the use of an ignition switch
key), which fact the defendant denied knowing; and that, when the
officers had inquired of the defendant as to the owner of the auto-
mobile, his associate had told the officers that the defendant owned
it, but the defendant had said that it belonged to a friend whose name
he did not know. The court also recounted the defendant's testimony
that his associate, prior to coming to the defendant's home in the
automobile at around midnight to pick up the defendant, had invited
him to go riding in a car which the associate had said he would
"borrow"; that the associate had driven the automobile to within
two blocks of the point where they were apprehended by the officers;
and that he had taken the wheel for those two blocks at the associate's
request in order to enable the associate to check the automobile's volt
meter. Based on this evidence, the court held that the jury below
could have properly concluded that the defendant had had possession39
36. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4217, -4218 (Supp. 1962).
37. 352 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. 1961).
38. Franklin v. State, 202 Tenn. 666, 308 S.W.2d 417 (1957).
39. The court cited, for the proposition that even constructive possession is sufficient
to satisfy the "receiving" element of the offense, Edmondson v. State, 151 Tenn. 214,
268 S.W. 881 (1924). It is not clear how this principle is applicable to the instant
case, however, because if the defendant here bad any kind of possession at all, it
was actual possession since he physically had the wheel of the automobile and was
driving it about. A more interesting question, apparently not raised, is whether instead,
the defendant had only custody of the automobile, with the associate retaining pos-
session; and, if so, whether one who accepts only custody of stolen goods (assuming
all other necessary elements) is guilty of the offense of "receiving" stolen property. A
preliminary survey of textbooks, encyclopedias, and case reports turned up only
discussions as to sufficiency of various forms of possession for "receiving," the only
mention of custody being an occasional reference to control or dominion over custody
as "potential possession," which presumably is considered by some writers as sufficient
possession for the purpose of "receiving." The statement that "it is enough if the
accused has the control over the custodian or control over the property in the hands of
the thief" [People v. Poncher, 358 IMI. 73, 80-81, 192 N.E. 732, 735 (1934)], has been
used as a basis for the further statement that "the accused, if he has not the actual
physical possession of the property, must have some means of control or dominion over
its custody." People v. Mulford, 385 Ill. 48, 52 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1943); People v.
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of the automobile, knowing it to be stolen, and in his statement to the
officers had been trying to "cover up" the fact of wrongful possession.
The court might also have pointed out, although it did not, that the
word "conceal" as used in statutes such as the Tennessee statute is
not limited to literal hiding or secreting, but includes any act or
conduct which assists the thief in converting another person's property
to his own use or which may prevent or render more difficult its dis-
covery by the owner;40 and that there was room here for concluding,
from the defendant's statement to the officers, that he, with guilty
knowledge, was at the time concealing stolen property.
One other statement by the court in the Powell decision merits com-
ment. Having said that the defendant "was very much under the
influence of an intoxicant 41 at the time of his arrest, the court re-
marked that "the fact that the plaintiff in error was in an intoxicated
condition when he was found in possession of this property under
these circumstances is no defense to a crime of the kind. Thomas v.
State, 201 Tenn. 645, 301 S.W.2d 358."42 In the cited case the court
had approved the following statement concerning intoxication as a
defense to a charge of larceny:
That the accused may have been drunk, in the ordinary sense of that word,
is not sufficient. He must have been so drunk as to be incapable of conscious-
ness that he is committing a crime or of discriminating between right and
wrong. If this fact does appear, however, or if there is a reasonable doubt
that he was capable of forming or entertaining the necessary felonious intent,
he is not guilty of larceny, unless the intent to steal was formed while still
in possession of his reasoning powers.
43
This is a correct statement of principle, of course, and certainly applies
to Tennessee's statutory offense of receiving and concealing stolen
property, one element of which the code specifies as being "with in-
tent to deprive the true owner thereof"" 4 (which the supreme court has
held to be "the essence of the offense"45), for this is a requirement of
a specific intent;46 it is well-settled that even voluntary intoxication
may be so gross as to make one accused of a crime requiring specific
Piszczek, 404 IIl. 465, 89 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1949). This is not the same, it will be
observed, as saying that it is sufficient for the accused to have only custody of the
goods involved.
40. 2 WmAnToN, op. cit. supra note 9, § 570; CLARK & MARSHALL, Op. cit. supra note
13, at 865.
41. 352 S.W.2d 224 at 225.
42. Id. at 226.
43. Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 651, 301 S.W.2d 358 (1957), citing 32 Am. Jin.
Larceny § 42 (1941).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4217, -4218 (Supp. 1962).
45. Rice v. State, 50 Tenn. 215, 226 (1871).
46. PE nmNs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 281.
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intent incapable of such intent and therefore entitled to an acquittal.47
Also relevant is the rule that "voluntary drunkenness may be shown
to negative the existence of a knowledge of particular facts, when such
knowledge is an essential element of the offense charged" in view
of the code's further requirement, on the part of one who receives
or conceals stolen property, that he do so "knowing the same to have
been so obtained."49
It follows that the court's statement in the Powell case, quoted
above, concerning defendant's intoxication as a defense should have
been expanded to make it clear that intoxication was not a defense in
the instant case in the absence of a showing that it was so gross as to
render him incapable of (a) consciousness that he was committing
a crime or of discriminating between right or wrong, (b) having
the specific intent to deprive the true owner of his property, as re-
quired by statute, or (c) knowing that the goods involved had been
feloniously taken or stolen or were goods obtained by robbery or
wrongdoing. Certainly an accused in a receiving and concealing
prosecution is entitled to an affinmative charge to the jury that he is
entitled to an acquittal if at the time of the alleged offense he was
under such an incapacity, and it would be error to refuse to give such
an instruction.
4. Offenses Against Morality and Decency-(a) Keeping a Bawdy
House-Defense of Entrapment.-In appealing from a conviction of
operating a bawdy house and engaging in assignation, the defendant
in Roden v. State5° contended that the trial court had erred in not
sustaining her plea in abatement and in not directing a verdict for
defendant upon the completion of the state's proof, in that the proof
showed that the defendant had been entrapped. The state's proof
indicated that the defendant lived in and operated a certain motel in
Hamilton County; that men, alone, in pairs, or in small groups, and
men and women in couples, many arriving and departing in auto-
mobiles bearing Hamilton County license plates, were observed from
time to time at all hours of the day or night to enter and leave the
motel after a stay of from thirty minutes to two hours; that the motel
47. Id. at 790. Among such crimes are assault with intent to kill, to wound, to
rape, or to rob; burglary (specific intent to commit a felony); larceny and robbery
(specific intent to steal); and attempt to commit any crime for which it must be
shown that there was a specific intent to commit the crime charged to have been
attempted. CL~a & MARsHALL., op. cit. supra note 13, at 388-89. See also Steele v.
State, 189 Tenn. 424, 430, 225 S.W.2d 260 (1949); Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71,
77, 156 S.W.2d 385, 387 (1941).
48. CrAR & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 389. This principle would like-
wise be applicable to prosecutions for passing counterfeit money or uttering a forged
instrument, in which it must be proved that the accused had knowledge that the money
was counterfeit or the instrument forged. Ibid.
49. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4217,-4218 (Supp. 1962).
50. 352 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1961).
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had a reputation in the community where it was located of being a
bawdy house; that a city police department employee had registered
in his own name and lived at the motel for five days, during which
time the defendant had told him she "dated," and could supply "dates"
for his friends at about $15 each; that on a certain date the police
department employee had brought two men, one of whom was a
police officer, to the motel, where they had paid the defendant and
another woman, whom defendant then called in, $60 as the price for
retiring to separate rooms with them; and that, subsequently, two
additional police officers with search warrants had entered the bed-
rooms occupied by those parties and found the defendant completely
disrobed and the other woman partially so.
In affirming the conviction, and overruling the assignments in error,
the court emphasized that the police department employee "registered
at the motel under his own name, gave his correct home address and
acted in perfect good faith for the purpose of discovering or detecting
a situation that had been going on apparently for sometime, according
to other witnesses, and he in no way induced or lured by deception,
trickery or artifice the commission of the crimes charged in the in-
dictment. He did, while acting in good faith, furnish the opportunity
for the commission thereof by the defendant who had the requisite
criminal intent as evidenced by prior acts and deeds."51 And it quoted
with approval the following statement:
One who is instigated, induced, or lured by an officer of the lav or other
person, for the purpose of prosecution, into the commission of a crime which
he had otherwise no intention of committing may avail himself of the defense
of "entrapment." Such defense is not available, however, where the officer
or other person acted in good faith for the purpose of discovering or de-
tecting a crime and merely furnished the opportunity for the commission
thereof by one who had the requisite criminal intent.52
One could hardly quarrel with a conclusion that the defense of
entrapment is unavailing as regards a set of circumstances such as the
court found to have been proved in the Roden case. But one may cer-
tainly disagree with the court's reversion to the position that "en-
trapment is not a defense in Tennessee." 3 If entrapment is not a
defense, why did the court not say so and stop right there, instead
of going on to some lengths in the instant case to recount and lay
emphasis on facts that would be important only if entrapment is a
defense in Tennessee? That the defendant operated a bawdy house
is clear from the state's proof without the necessity of showing also
51. Id. at 229.
52. The quotation is from 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(2), at 138 (1961). (Em-
phasis added.)
53. 352 S.W.2d at 228.
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that the police agent obtained the proof "in perfect good faith," that
"he in no way induced or lured by deception, trickery or artifice the
commission of the crimes charged," and that all he did was to "furnish
the opportunity for the commission thereof" to one whose criminal in-
tent was already evidenced by prior acts. Further, the court in the
instant case cited with approval, as before noted, the principle that
under stated conditions "one... may avail himself of the defense of
'entrapment."' Furthermore, the only case cited by the court here for
the proposition that entrapment is not a defense in Tennessee is a
1960 decision 4 wherein it reversed a criminal conviction after therein
saying that "there is only one question before us and that is the court
below erred in not allowing these defendants the defense of entrap-
ment,"55 pointing out as to one of its previous decisions on entrap-
ment 6 that "the court did not say that it would not recognize the
defense of entrapment where the whole machinery to violate the law
originated in the minds of the officers of the law, or their agents,"
57
and citing with approval the statement that "entrapment is shown
where it appears that officers of the law or their agents . . . lured
[the] accused into committing an offense", and determining that
"under the facts in this particular case these defendants were lured
into the commission of the offense."59
It continues to be clear, therefore, that the defense of entrapment
is, in substance, recognized in Tennessee. It is not at all clear, on
the other hand, why the Tennessee Supreme Court does not now un-
equivocally recognize the defense by name. We repeat the suggestion
made in previous articles: 60 defense attorneys should not hesitate
to raise the defense of entrapment in cases in which the state has
used its own officers or informers to instigate crime, it being un-
thinkable that in the event of such circumstances the defense should
then be ruled out.
5. Offenses Against the Public Peace-(a) Carrying Concealed
House-breaking Tools.-In McDonald v. State61 a conviction for pos-
sessing burglary tools, under a statute providing that any one who
"carries concealed about the person" articles intended for effecting
54. Hagemaker v. State, 208 Tenn. 565, 347 S.W.2d 488 (1961); Kendrick,
Criminal Law and Procedure-1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 VAxo. L. EEv. 860,
863-65 (1962).
55. 208 Tenn. at 566, 347 S.W.2d at 489.
56. Thomas v. State, 182 Tenn. 380, 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945).
57. 208 Tenn. at 568, 347 S.W.2d at 489.
58. 208 Tenn. at 570, 347 S.W.2d at 491, quoting from 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 45(2), at 138 (1961).
59. 208 Tenn. at 571, 347 S.W.2d at 491.
60. Kendrick, Criminal Law and Procedure-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L.
.Ev. 1059, 1062-63 (1960); id., 1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 VAND. L. BE;v. 860,
863-65 (1962).
61. 358 S.W.2d 298 (Tenn. 1962).
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secret entrances into houses, for the purpose of committing theft, or
other violations of the law, is guilty of a felony,6 was appealed from,
the contention apparently being that no such tools had been found
concealed about the defendant's person. Based upon evidence that
police saw the defendant, behind a store at 1:10 a.m., run to and crouch
behind a trash can, that he was wearing gloves and had a flashlight
in his pocket, that, lying at his feet, were found a bolt cutter, a screw
driver, and a pry bar, and that next door was another store secured by
a chain and lock, the court held that the jury could properly find
defendant guilty as charged in that the tools were concealed along
with his person behind the trash can and, being at his feet, were
sufficiently about his person.
(b) Drunken Driving.-In Williams v. State63 the defendant ap-
pealed from a conviction of drunken driving of an automobileP4 con-
tending that the proof concerning his alleged conduct showed that he
had been neither drunk nor driving. The court reviewed the evidence
to the effect that although the defendant was not drunk and was not
behind the wheel personally driving the automobile, he, the owner,
was present on the front seat of the automobile with an individual,
whom he, not having a driver's license of his own, had allowed to
drive, and who was so "wobbley" that he was noticeably drunk. This
evidence, the court held, warranted the jury below in finding the
defendant guilty of participating in the commission of the offense of
drunken driving. In this connection the court invoked common law to
the effect that one who aids and abets in the commission of a mis-
demeanor is deemed to be a principal,65 and that one who sits by a
driver whom he knows to be intoxicated and permits him without pro-
test to operate an automobile aids and abets in the offense of driving
while intoxicated.66 Moreover, a Tennessee statute provides that a per-
son who aids and abets the commission of any act "declared in chapters
8 or 10 of this title [title 59] to be a crime" [the drunken driving
statute (section 59-1031) being in chapter 10] "shall be guilty of such
offense" and that one who willfully causes, permits, or directs another
"to violate any provision of chapters 8 or 10 of this title is likewise
guilty of such offense." 67
6. Offenses Affecting Sovereignty- (a) Abuse of Elective Franchise.
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-908 (1956).
63. 353 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1961).
64. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 59-1031 (Supp. 1962).
65. Swift v. State, 108 Tenn. 610, 612, 69 S.W. 326 (1902); Atkins v. State, 95
Tenn. 474, 477, 32 S.W. 391 (1895).
66. Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 169, 325 S.W.2d 815, 821 (1959). See also
Story v. United States, 57 App. D.C. 3, 16 Fed. 342 (D.C. Cir. 1926), cert. denied,
274 U.S. 739 (1927); 5 B.AsH FIE, CYCLOPEDrA OF AuTroMoBmLE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2930 (perm. ed. 1954); 3 WH"ToN, op. cit. supra note 9, § 990.
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1016 (1956).
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-The supreme court in Mowery v. State6 was faced with the problem
of what to do when two state statutes appear to prohibit the same
wrong and prescribe different degrees of punishment for that wrong.
The defendant in that case had been indicted and convicted under
a statute making his alleged conduct a felony, and he appealed on the
ground that the indictment and prosecution should have been under
another statute making his alleged conduct a misdeameanor.
There was evidence that the defendant had on the occasion of the
holding of an election in a certain place entered therein, threatening
to blow out the brains of the election officials if they interfered, and
had then at pistol point taken a ballot box containing ballots of voters
and voter registration books. The indictment charged the defendant
with statutory armed robbery69 in that he, by force and violence ac-
complished by the use of a deadly weapon, had taken from the person
and custody of the named election officials and against their will one
ballot box, lock, and registration book of a value of ten dollars.
The statute under which the defendant contended the indictment
and prosecution should have been brought provides punishment for
breaking up an election.
70
The supreme court's starting point was the code's statutory con-
struction section providing that "if provisions of different titles or
chapters of the Code appear to contravene each other, the provisions
of each title or chapter shall prevail as to all matters and questions
growing out of the subject-matter of that title or chapter."' Inasmuch
as title!2 of the code is wholly devoted to elections, and chapter 22
thereof is designed to cover the entire subject matter of penal pro-
visions as to the holding of elections, the court reasoned that the
statute (under that title and chapter) providing punishment for
breaking up an election had peculiar applicability to matters growing
out of elections and that the legislature had had such particular mat-
ters as presented by the facts of this case in mind when it was enacted.
On the other hand, the court was of the opinion that the robbery
68. 352 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1961).
69. "Robbery is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another, goods
or money of any value, by violence or putting the person in fear. Every person convicted
of the crime of robbery shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than five (5)
nor more than fifteen (15) years; provided, that if the robbery be accomplished by
the use of a deadly weapon the punishment shall be death by electrocution, or the
jury may commute the punishment to imprisonment for life or for any period of time
not less than ten (10) years." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Supp. 1962).
70. "If any person by force or violence break up or attempt to break up any
legalized political convention, primary or final election, by assaulting the officers thereof,
or by destroying or carrying off the ballot box, or by the use of other forcible or
violent means to prevent a nomination being fairly made, or election from being fairly
and legally conducted, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." TENN. CoDE ANN. §
2-220 (1956).
71. TmFzs. CODE ANN. § 1-303 (1956).
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statute relates to robberies in general and has no particular reference
to elections. The court then invoked the rules of construction that "a
special provision in a statute will control a general provision which
would otherwise include that mentioned in the particular provision"'?
and that in such cases the special provision must be taken as intended
to constitute an exception to the general provision, 3 which will con-
tinue to be operative on all subjects except as to the particular one
which is the subject of the special provision.74 The court therefore con-
cluded as to the facts of this case that "since the legislature has spoken
in specific terms as to the penalty to be inflicted for breaking up or in-
specific terms as to the penalty to be inflicted for breaking up or in-
terfering with an election . . . . Then the general statute having
to do with armed robbery has no application." 75 Therefore, since the
acts of the defendant accordingly were punishable only under the
breaking-up-of-elections statute, the court held that he should have
been indicted under the latter statute instead of that under which
he had been convicted, and it reversed and dismissed the case.
II. CIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. Limitations of Prosecution-(a) Jurisdiction.-Juvenile court
jurisdiction was at issue in State ex rel. Hyatt v. Bomar.16 Hyatt, at
about age seventeen, entered a plea of guilty in juvenile court to a
burglary charge and was thereupon committed to a state juvenile
vocational school until he should become "21 years of age." After a
few months in the school he escaped and was away for about 13
months, including a period of confinement at the direction of a Ken-
tucky juvenile court. Upon his return to the Tennessee juvenile cor-
rection school in April, 1960, pursuant to statutory authority77 he was
formally declared an incorrigible youth by the state commissioner of
correction and was transferred to the state penitentiary. In January,
1962, Hyatt reached the age of twenty-one and applied for a release
from the penitentiary on the ground that the term of confinement
ordered by the juvenile court had expired on that event; but the
warden denied the application on the theory that Hyatt was required
to serve thirteen months beyond the date originally set for his release,
in order to make up the thirteen months that he as an escapee had
72. State ex rel. v. Safley, 172 Tenn. 385, 112 S.W.2d 831, 833 (1938). See also
Woodroof v. City of Nashville, 183 Tenn. 483, 192 S.W.2d 1013 (1946).
73. Keefe v. Atkins, 199 Tenn. 183, 285 S.W.2d 338 (1955); Atlas Powder Co. v.
Leister, 197 Tenn. 491, 274 S.W.2d 364 (1954); Woodroof v. City of Nashville, 183
Tenn. 483, 192 S.W.2d 1013 (1946).
74. State ex rel. v. Safley, 172 Tenn. 385, 112 S.W.2d 831 (1938).
75. 352 S.W.2d at 440.
76. 358 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. 1962).
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-817 (1956).
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remained away from the school. Hyatt then petitioned criminal court
for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.78 On appeal the
criminal court judgment was reversed, and Hyatt's application for
release under writ of habeas corpus was ordered granted. The court
pointed to the statute governing juvenile court jurisdiction stating
that "such jurisdiction shall continue for the purposes of this chapter,
until the child shall have attained its majority" and that "in no case
shall a child be committed by a juvenile court beyond the age of
twenty-one (21) years,"79 and to a previous decision of its own that
the provision in the juvenile court statute for the transfer of in-
corrigibles to the penitentiary "was a matter of wise administration of
an institution erected for the betterment of wayward young people,
and not an added punishment for crime."8 0 Since Hyatts detention
could be based solely on authority vested in the juvenile court by the
statute creating it, and since that court had no authority of commit-
ment for penal purposes and therefore had no further jurisdiction of
the person of Hyatt after he became twenty-one, the court held that
the warden, whose only authority derived from lawful jurisdiction
exercised by the juvenile court, likewise could not extend Hyatt's
detention beyond his twenty-first birthday.
In another case involving jurisdiction of a juvenile, Greene v.
State,8' the defendant, a fifteen-year-old boy, was indicted and tried
in criminal court on separate counts respectively charging rape and
assault with intent to carnally know a female under twelve years of
age. After the state had completed its proof, Greene's counsel moved
that the entire indictment be quashed, apparently on the theory that
the state had failed to introduce any evidence of penetration, an
essential element of rape, and that the criminal court had no juris-
diction at all over Greene with respect to the other count. The motion
was 'denied, the trial court withdrew the rape count from the jury,
78. The criminal court based its judgment on the theory that Hyatt's continued
confinement was pursuant to the statutory requirement that "Any person lawfully
confined in any county jail or in the penitentiary upon conviction for a criminal offense,
who escapes therefrom, may be pursued, taken, and again imprisoned . . . and the
period elapsing between his escape and arrest shall not be computed as any portion
of the term of imprisonment for which he was sentenced." TENN. CODE ANN. §
89-3811 (1956). In its reply brief on appeal, however, the state conceded that this
section was not applicable to this case.
79. TEr. CODE AN r. § 37-263 (Supp. 1962).
80. Harwood v. State ex rel. Pillars, 184 Tenn. 515, 521, 201 S.W.2d 672, 674
(1947). The court also went behind the juvenile court statutes and considered their
underlying purposes-not to. try children for criminal offenses but to undertake to
remedy the delinquency of minors, to reform and educate them (citing Childress v.
State, 133 Tenn. 121, 123, 179 S.W. 643, 644 (1915)). When one ceases to be a
juvenile, the court reasoned further, then the sole object for which the juvenile court
was created no longer applies to him and confining him in the penitentiary thereafter
could only be for a purpose not contemplated by the statute-punishment as an adult
for something he had done while an infant. 358 S.W.2d at 298.
81. 358 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1962).
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and Greene was found guilty of the other charge and sentenced to a
ten-year prison term. Apparently, the trial judge also denied a motion
in arrest of judgment and for transfer to juvenile court. On appeal
both the defendant's own counsel and the state filed briefs in his
behalf. Taking an over-all view of the code chapter on "Juvenile
Courts,"M the supreme court stated that juvenile courts have been
vested with exclusive jurisdiction of all offenses, except rape and
murder, committed by persons under eighteen years of age.P The
court pointed to its prior decisionM that, except where the indictment
of a minor below the statutory age is for murder or rape, a plea in
abatement to the jurisdiction of a criminal court is good in view of the
otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Treating the
finding of the jury below of guilty of assault with the intent to carnally
know a female under twelve years of age (an offense separate and
distinct from rape and not a lesser included offense ) as a finding
that the defendant had not committed rape, the court held that when
it was concluded that some offense other than murder or rape had
been committed, the trial judge should have sustained the defendant's
motion and transferred the case to juvenile court.
Does a criminal court have jurisdiction to decree forfeiture of office
of a general sessions judge on a finding that he has violated the pro-
visions of a criminal statute one of the penalties of which is forfeiture
of office? That question was at issue in Sams v. State,86 where the
defendant judge had been found guilty in criminal court of violating
statutory prohibitions87 against returning to an arrested person a wea-
pon that the latter had been convicted of carrying concealed, for which
offense of returning, penalties of a $25 fine and forfeiture of office
were provided.88 The supreme court affirmed the assignments of error
challenging the jurisdiction of the criminal court to oust the defendant
from office, holding that the general sessions court is an inferior court
under state constitution provisions 9 and that the judge thereof is
accordingly protected from removal from office except by impeach-
ment as provided in the constitution,90 but it affirmed the judgment
of conviction and fine.
(b) Agreement Not To Prosecute.-The Code provides that after
an indictment is found a criminal prosecution cannot be abandoned
82. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 37, ch. 2 (Supp. 1962).
83. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (Supp. 1962).
84. Howland v. State, 151 Tenn. 47, 268 S.W. 115 (1925).
85. Bowmer v. State, 157 Tenn. 124, 6 S.W.2d 326 (1928); Sydney v. State, 22
Tenn. 478 (1842).
86. 356 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1962).
87. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4911, -4912 (1956).
88. TENN. COD- ANN. § 39-4913 (1956).
89. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
90. Tm.. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
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without leave of the court.91 In the Powell case92 the trial court
denied such leave, although, according to the defendant's allegation
on appeal from his conviction of receiving and stealing stolen property,
the assistant district attorney general had agreed to nolle prosequi the
indictment charging that offense, in exchange for the defendant's
agreeing to plead guilty to drunk driving. While not stated in the
report of the case, the defendant apparently contended on appeal
that he had by this agreement obtained immunity to prosecution for
receiving and concealing and that his conviction therefor was invalid.
The supreme court, however, affirming the conviction, held that such
an agreement is not binding on the trial court and is no defense to the
prosecution.
9 3
In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to a previous de-
cision1 4 wherein it had held that one who gave evidence to law en-
forcement officers concerning an offense committed by other parties,
with the understanding that in return for such cooperation on his
part he would not be prosecuted for another offense, did not thereby
acquire immunity to such prosecution. At the close of the opinion
in the previous decision is the remark that "normally where such a
promise is made in good faith and the party who then cooperates and
gives the state the necessary assistance the district attorney general
may with the consent of the trial court take care of the matter."95 And
the court in the instant decision indicated that such procedure might
have been proper under the circumstances of this case had the trial
court been convinced that the defendant in fact had fulfilled his end
of the bargain and thereupon had given leave for abandonment of the
prosecution under the indictment count in question.96 Also in the
instant decision, after quoting a reference to "authority that such
an agreement [of accused to plead guilty to one charge and of the
state not to prosecute on others] when approved by the court and
fulfilled by the accused, should be given effect,"w the supreme court
said, "We accept the quoted statement above as the applicable rule
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2101 (1956).
92. Powell v. State, supra note 37.
93. The court quoted and accepted the following statement as the applicable rule:
"An agreement by a prosecuting official or a law enforcement officer to dismiss the
charge against accused or grant him immunity from prosecution in return for a plea
of guilty, or certain co-operative measures by accused, is not binding on the court and
is no defense to the prosecution. Thus, an agreement between a prosecuting attorney
and an accused charged with several offenses that if he pleads guilty to one charge he
will not be prosecuted on the other charges is not a binding agreement, it has been
held, so as to bar a later prosecution on one of such other charges .... " 22 C.J.S
Criminal Law § 53, at 192 (1961).
94. Bruno v. State, 192 Tenn. 244, 240 S.W.2d 528 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
840 (1951).
95. 192 Tenn. at 250, 240 S.W.2d at 531.
96. 352 S.W.2d at 227.
97. 352 S.W.2d at 227, quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 53, at 192 (1961).
1963]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to apply under such situations."98
In summary, the supreme court's attitude seems to be that it is
proper for a trial court to give leave for abandonment of a prosecution
under an indictment when there has been a good faith agreement
that such would be done by the state in exchange for defendant's
undertaking (which he has since fulfilled) to plead guilty to another
charge or to give other requested cooperation but that such an agree-
ment is not binding on the trial court and is no defense to prosecution
unless the agreement shall have been first approved by the court and
afterwards fulfilled by the defendant.
2. Proceedings Preliminary to Trial-(a) Searches and Seizures With-
out Warrants.-In a burglary prosecution an arresting officer testified
that he and other officers, upon receiving information that the de-
fendant's trailer contained stolen goods, went there without a search
warrant, knocked on the door, and, when the defendant opened it,
greeted him by his first name. The officer testified further: "So he
opened the door, said 'come on in' [not recognizing the entrants as
officers] .... I said 'Kenneth, we came out here to talk to you. We
have information that you have some stolen stuff .... [W]e want to
look around, if you request it, we'll have to get a warrant, and if you
request the warrant some of us are going to stay here and let the others
go get the search warrant to search.' I had done seen enough I knew
it was necessary to search. So he said, 'well, I don't know what you're
looking for but if you insist you're going to get a warrant anyway,
just go ahead and search."' On the basis of evidence turned up in the
ensuing search, the defendant was convicted on a burglary charge;
and he appealed.
The supreme court, in Simmons v. State,99 affirmed the conviction,
citing authority to the effect that a search without a warrant may be
valid where the officers' entry is made without coercion 00 and where
the defendant also waives his constitutional rights concerning searches
and seizures. 10 The court detailed two previous search and seizure
without valid warrant cases similarly raising coercion and waiver
questions. In one, Hampton v. State,102 it had held that a defendant
acted of necessity and not of volition in submitting to a search without
a valid warrant when he disclosed to officers the location of goods
sought by them, upon their assertion that they had a warrant (in fact,
invalid) and that he might as well disclose location of the goods and
thereby avoid the consequences of search. In the other, Frix v.
98. 352 S.W.2d at 227.
99. 360 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1962).
100. Byrd v. State, 161 Tenn. 306, 30 S.W.2d 273 (1930).
101. United States v. Jones, 204 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1953); Frix v. State, 148 Tenn.
478, 256 S.W. 449 (1923).
102. 148 Tenn. 155, 252 S.W. 1007 (1923).
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State,03 from evidence that arresting officers had asked the defendant
if they would be required to go to town and obtain a search warrant
to search his premises or whether he would be willing to let them
search without a warrant and that the defendant had responded, "Mr.
Brown [one of the officers], you are welcome to go anywhere on my
place you want to and search. Go to it," the court in Frix had
distinguished the Hampton case and held that in the case before it
there had been a waiver, not evoked by coercion, of the defendant's
right to require a warrant.104 The supreme court in the instant case
was of the opinion that the facts therein were controlled by the Frix
holding. While conceding that the defendant, Simmons, confronted
as he was with officers who declared their readiness (while keeping
him under surveillance) to obtain a search warrant if he did not con-
sent to search without a warrant, had little choice but to let them
search, the court stated that this situation was not produced by coer-
cion on the officers' part, but was of his own making.
The general rule in this regard is said to be that "for an occupant to
waive his rights, it must clearly appear that he voluntarily permitted
or expressly invited and agreed to the search, being cognizant of his
rights in the premises; whether such a consent was freely given is a
question of fact."0 5 Without quarreling with the court's determination
of this question in the Simmons decision, one may observe that it may
not always clearly appear that a defendant in such a situation was
cognizant of his rights and yet freely or voluntarily relinquished them.
3. Trial-(a) Consolidation for Trial.-The general rule is that several
indictments against the same defendant (or defendants) charging
related offenses may be consolidated for trial, and that it is immaterial
in this connection that one of the offenses charged is a felony and
another is a misdemeanor.10 6 The Tennessee Supreme Court, which
has long held10 7 that separate counts for felonies and misdemeanors
of the same nature and growing out of the same transaction may be
joined in a single indictment, sensibly held in Hardin v. State10 8 that
103. 148 Tenn. 478, 256 S.W. 449 (1923).
104. "The facts in the instant case are not at all analogous to the facts in the
Hampton Case. Here, instead of announcing their intention to search whether permis-
sion was given or not, the officers informed defendant that unless permission was given
they would be compelled to go back to town and procure a search warrant. There
was no coercion about the defendant's subsequent agreement and consent that the
search be made without a warrant. He therefore waived his right to require that the
officers obtain a search warrant before searching his premises." 148 Tenn. at 488, 256
S.W. at 452.
105. 4 WHmRTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PRocEaoua § 1578 (Anderson ed. 1957), and
cases cited.
106. 5 id. § 1942; ORFIELD, CRumnNAL PROcEDuPR FROM AImEST To APPEAL 320
(1947).
107. See, e.g., Tenpenny v. State, 151 Tenn. 669, 270 S.W. 989 (1924).
108. 355 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1962).
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it was not error for the trial court to permit the defendant therein to
be tried in a single trial on one indictment charging second degree
murder for killing with an automobile and on a second indictment
charging driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, in view
of the fact that the two charges were based on the same transaction
and were not repugnant or inconsistent.
(b) Selection of Jurors.-In a trial of a criminal case, may a juror
be peremptorily challenged after he has been accepted but before
he has been sworn? 10 9
A number of years ago, two days after a juror had been selected
but before the jury had been sworn, a defendant in a criminal prose-
cution in Tennessee asked leave of the trial court to challenge
peremptorily that juror, although stating that he had no ground to
challenge for cause. The supreme court held" that the trial court
did not err in refusing to permit such a challenge. Noting that under
the state's system for jury selection an accused is given every oppor-
tunity to inform himself about individuals summoned for jury service
and to exercise his challenges before the jurors are selected, the court
declared that "to establish the right of peremptory challenge at any
time before the swearing of the jury would be the defeat of fair and
impartial trials in many instances.""'
Because of the fact that publication of the foregoing decision was
not authorized, the supreme court some seventy-five years later said
that evidently the court had not wished to be bound by its opinion
therein.12 The court in the case before it at that later date held that a
trial court had not erred, after a juror had been expressly accepted
by both sides but before the jury had been sworn, in permitting the
state peremptorily and without stated cause to challenge that juror
when both sides had peremptory challenges remaining." 3
109. On the question as it relates to peremptory challenges, see Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d
499 (1949).
110. McLean v. State, 1 Tenn. Cas. (Shannon) 478 (1875). A federal court sitting
in Tennessee refused to follow the McLean decision and held instead that no error
was committed in allowing the district attorney after the jury box was full to challenge
peremptorily a juror who had been accepted by both sides. United States v. Davis,
103 Fed. 457 (W.D. Tenn. 1900).
111. McLean v. State, supra note 110, at 483.
112. Estep v. State, 193 Tenn. 222, 245 S.W.2d 623 (1951), 22 T&N. L. REv. 574
(1952).
113. "Where twelve veniremen have been passed by the State and accepted by the
defendant there is no injustice to the latter for the trial court to permit the State to
peremptorily challenge a juror where the defendant has not exhausted his peremptory
challenges, and provided the defendant is granted the same privilege. In most cases, if
not in all, such a rule would be advantageous to the accused. It is a matter of common
knowledge that in many instances it requires days and sometimes weeks to secure
twelve unbiased jurors. During that time and before the jury is completed and sworn,
the defendant and his friends may have learned facts which would justify a challenge
for cause, or a peremptory challenge of a juror already accepted, but not sworn. There
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During the 1962 survey period, the supreme court in the Dupes
case" 4 was faced with the question again when the defendant therein
assigned for error the refusal of the trial court to allow him, while he
had peremptory challenges remaining and before the jury had been
sworn, peremptorily to challenge a certain juror who had been ac-
cepted by both sides. "We think this ruling was correct," the court
concluded after referring to the trial court's holding as to the chal-
lenged juror that "there was no ground to disqualify him and no
ground for peremptory challenge of him after he had been accepted by
both sides."" 5
The common law rule that a juror could be peremptorily challenged
at any time prior to being sworn" 6 has been adopted by a number of
American jurisdictionsl21 while others have held that a juror cannot
be challenged peremptorily as a matter of right after his acceptance
by the party challenging or by both sides." 8 And in some states,
usually by statute, a trial court may for good cause allow the per-
emptory challenge of a juror who has been accepted and sworn, "good
cause" being interpreted to pertain to something which has arisen
subsequent to the acceptance of the juror or which would not ordi-
narily be discovered by the voir dire examination. 119
The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the availability of
peremptory challenges is a privilege granted by the legislature as a
matter of grace, rather than a constitutionally secured right,20 and
that the "mode of exercising challenges" rests within the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge.12 ' With no statutory provision on the point,
the supreme court apparently considers the question of proper time
for exercising peremptory challenges as one subject to the trial court's
discretionary authority to determine the "mode of exercising chal-
lenges."
The Dupes case indicates that whether a trial court will exercise
its discretion in this regard, in favor of allowing a peremptory chal-
lenge of a juror after both sides have accepted him, may be in-
fluenced by the extent to which the party who wishes to challenge
has a good cause shown, although, again, there is no specifically
is no reason why the trial judge should not allow such a challenge. Since the State is
entitled to a fair, impartial and unprejudiced jury, the same as the defendant, its right
of challenge under the same circumstances should be granted." 193 Tenn. at 227,
245 S.W.2d at 625.
114. Dupes v. State, supra note 10.
115. 354 S.W.2d at 457.
116. Favoring this rule is Baugh, Selecting a Trial Jury in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L.
REv. 220, 223 (1952).
117. 5 WHARTON, CimIzNAL LAw "D PRocEDuRE § 1993 (Anderson ed. 1957).
118. Id. § 1994.
119. Ibid.
120. Mahon v. State, 127 Tenn. 535, 546, 156 S.W. 458, 461 (1912).
121. Estep v. State, supra note 112, at 227, 245 S.W.2d at 625.
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applicable statute in point. In Dupes the defendant stated to the
trial court that only after voir dire examination did he learn that the
juror whom he now wished to challenge peremptorily had viewed the
body and scene of the homicide and there conversed with an in-
dividual later subpoenaed, but not used, as a witness by the state.
Upon determining that no material fact had been stated to the juror
in the conversation, however, the trial court found no ground for
disqualification and presumably no good cause for allowing a per-
emptory challenge; its ruling to disallow the challenge was on appeal
permitted to stand.
(c) Evidence.-Evidentiary questions involved in some of the
criminal cases decided during the past year are treated elsewhere in
this survey,' 22 but they are footnoted here'23 as a convenience to the
reader.
122. Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. BEv.
817 (1963).
123. Burden of proof: Terrell v. State, 361 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1962) (burden on
defendants to show that they came within statutory exceptions, such being defenses).
Circumstantial evidence: Hardin v. State, 355 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1962) (sufficient
for conviction where consistent with defendant's guilt and excludes every reasonable
theory of innocence). Coerced statements: Hardin v. State, supra (defendant's pre-
trial statement after prolonged questioning was admissible as not coerced in view of
his age, experience as a former police officer, and friendship with interrogating officers);
Dupes v. State, 354 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. 1962) (admission of defendant's pre-trial
statement taken after 48 hours dentention not a violation of constitutional rights). Cor-
pus delicti: Miller v. State, 358 S.W.2d 325 (Tenn. 1962) (confession may be admitted
before proof of); Jamison v. State, 354 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1962) (proved by circum-
stantial evidence, fingerprints). Corroboration: King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn.
1962) (not required to support testimony of prosecutrix in rape case, but admissible to
confirm her credibility as witness). Cross examination: Sissom v. State, 360 S.W.2d
227 (Tenn. 1962) (defendant's testimony, thereby obtained, as to a pending indictment
is incompetent). Hearsay: King v. State, supra (statements made by prosecutrix in
rape case shortly after commission of offense may be proved by person to whom
made). Impeachment of witnesses: Hardin v. State, supra (evidence of statements
made out of court, allegedly inconsistent with testimony given at trial, not admissible
to impeach witness until proper foundation made therefor). Incompetent evidence,
admission of: Terrell v. State, supra (not reversible error in trial without jury where
other ample evidence to sustain conviction). Presumptions and inferences: Bostick v.
State, 360 S.W.2d 472 (Tenn. 1962) (use of deadly weapon resulting in death raises
presumption of malice, to sustain murder in second degree); Nance v. State, 358
S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1962) (unexplained possession and claim of interest in forged
instrument raises presumption that possessor forged it or procured it to be forged and
satisfies requirements of knowledge of forgery and intent to defraud); Roe v. State,
358 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1962) (a fact inferred from circumstantial evidence may be
the basis of a further inference); Evans v. State, 354 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn. 1962)
(presumption that owner of premises is in possession of liquor found there is not
raised when there is evidence that premises are occupied by others). Rebuttal evidence:
Hardin v. State, supra (discretionary with trial judge as to whether to allow evidence
again on rebuttal where already received on direct). Reputation: Chaffin v. State, 354
S.W.2d 772 (Tenn. 1962) (evidence in homicide prosecution of deceased's reputation
for peace and violence is admissible, but exclusion of evidence of specific act of
deceased toward third persons is proper). Sufficiency of evidence: Jamison v. State,
supra (evidence of defendant's fingerprints on a machine moved from one part of a
burglarized room to another on the night of burglary, sufficient to establish guilt).
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(d) Sequestration of Witnesses.-It is generally accepted in this
country that the presiding judge in the trial of a criminal prosecution
may, when it shall seem to him necessary for the due administration
of justice, order a separation of the witnesses and an exclusion of all
other witnesses (except the accused) from the courtroom while any
witness is testifying. In the absence of a statute, such an order is not a
matter of right, but largely one of judicial discretion which appellate
courts do not disturb in the absence of manifest prejudice or abuse. M
In Nance v. State125 the trial judge put the witnesses under "the
rule," that is, sequestered them, and subsequently barred three of the
state's witnesses from the stand when it appeared they had been
taken into the office of the assistant district attorney general for
consultation during a recess of the trial. However, after the close of the
defendant's proof, including testimony of the defendant on cross
examination denying certain facts to which he had admitted in a
written statement, the court permitted one of the three barred wit-
nesses to testify in rebuttal for the state. The supreme court, citing
Tennessee precedents 126 to the effect that trial judges have a large
discretion with respect to "the rule" and that their actions in applying
it will not be reversed in the absence of abuse of discretion, held that
the record justified the action of the trial court in the instant case and
that such action had not been abusive.
(e) Verdict.-The Tennessee Code provides in sections dating back
to 1858 that "upon an indictment against several defendants, any one
or more may be convicted or acquitted" 2 7 and that "in an indictment
against several, if the jury cannot agree upon a verdict as to all, they
may render a verdict as to those in regard to whom they agree on
which a judgment shall be entered."m
In State ex rel. Myers v. Brown 9 the state supreme court was
called on for the first time to construe the above two sections. The
relator had been tried with five other men jointly indicted upon three
indictments. The jury, at the conclusion of the trial, had first an-
nounced separate verdicts as to each defendant, finding two of them
guilty of specified charges and finding the other four not guilty. It
appearing that the jury had failed to fix the punishment as to the
two defendants found guilty, the judge had then caused the jury to
124. 2 UNDER1omL, CmImNAL EVIDENCE § 510 (5th ed. 1956) and cases cited
therein.
125. 358 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1962).
126. Bass v. State, 191 Tenn. 259, 231 S.W.2d 707 (1950); Pennington v. State,
136 Tenn. 533, 190 S.W. 546 (1916). See also Ray v. State, 108 Tenn. 282, 67 S.W.
533 (1902); Pile v. State, 107 Tenn. 532, 64 S.W. 477 (1901); Nelson v. State, 32
Tenn. 237 (1852).
127. TmmN. CODE ANN. § 40-2523 (1956).
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2524 (1956).
129. 351 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1961).
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retire for further deliberation. At this point he had entered on the
court docket "not guilty" as to the relator. The next day, the jury had
returned to the courtroom and reported that they were then in com-
plete disagreement not only as to punishment but as to guilt or in-
nocence of the defendants, including those whom they had earlier
found not guilty. The trial judge thereupon had declared a mistrial
and, erasing the "not guilty" entry by the relator's name in the
court docket, substituted "mis-trial." Afterwards, relator had sought
release through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the trial court
sustained it, and the state appealed from it.
The supreme court affirmed, holding that as to the relator the jury
had rendered a final, complete, and unanimous verdict of not guilty
and had discharged their duty to him in full; that the verdict had been
accepted by the trial court; that, even though the jury remained un-
discharged for the purpose of considering punishment for the de-
fendants previously found guilty, they could not retract the verdict
of not guilty as to the relator; that a judgment of acquittal should
have been entered as to him, pursuant to the above-quoted statute;
and that he was therefore entitled to be released and discharged. The
court's decision in this case, concerning which it noted that it had
found none other analogous, seems eminently correct.
Two matters relative to the verdict were involved in the Nance
case. 130 As to one, the court held that the trial court had not erred in
overruling the defendant's motion for a directed verdict since "we
in this State have never approved the granting of a directed verdict
in a criminal case,"131 a position which has been criticized in previous
survey articles.132 Perhaps hope that a different position may some
day be adopted by the court can be derived from its added remarks
that "there is sufficient evidence in this case, as determined by the
court below, for the questions here presented to be passed upon by a
jury. Thus the motion for a directed verdict was properly over-
ruled."'3
The other verdict matter in Nance concerned the interpretation to
be given the statutory provision that "The trial judges in all courts of
record in which suits are tried by juries, in both criminal and civil
cases, shall be required to poll the jury on application of either the
state or the defendant in criminal cases and either the plaintiff or the
defendant in civil cases, without exception."'3 The court, properly,
130. Nance v. State, supra note 125.
131. 358 S.W.2d at 328.
132. Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REV.
1197, 1224 (1960); Kendrick, Criminal Law and Procedure-1960 Tennessee Survey,
13 VAND. L. REv. 1059, 1091 (1960).
133. 358 S.W.2d at 329.
134. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1324 (Supp. 1962).
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we think, held that the failure of the trial court in that case to poll
the jury was not error, as defendant claimed, when the defendant had
not made application for polling, because the wording of the statute
shows a clear intent that polling is required only upon application of
one of the parties. Undoubtedly, however, in the absence of an ap-
plication by one of the parties, the trial judge may still in his discretion
poll the jury.
(f) Motions After Verdict.-Two cases decided during the survey
period had to do with the proper interpretation and application of
code section 27-201, which reads as follows:
A rehearing or motion for new trial can be applied for within thirty (30)
days from the decree, verdict, or judgment sought to be affected, subject,
however, to the rules of court prescribing the length of time in which the
application is to be made, but such rules in no case shall allow less than
ten (10) days for such application. The expiration of a term of court during
said period shall not shorten the time allowed. 35
In Shettles v. State'3 the state moved to dismiss the appeal from a
judgment of conviction, contending that the defendant had failed to
file her motion for a new trial within thirty days of the verdict. The
supreme court, reviewing the record, determined that immediately
after a notation that the verdict of the jury was entered on June 29,
1960, there followed the words, "thereupon the defendant, through her
counsel of record, moves the Court for a new trial herein, which
motion is set for hearing on August 2, 1960"; that by subsequent
entries hearing on the motion was reset for, and had on, December 2,
1960; and that the motion was not put into writing, together with the
allegations of errors in the trial, until November 25, 1960. The state's
contention that the defendant's motion for a new trial was untimely
seems to have been based on the theory that in effect the motion was
not made until put into writing, which was more than thirty days fol-
lowing the verdict.
The supreme court noted that many of the trial courts in Tennessee,
pursuant to their statutory authority to make rules of practice deemed
expedient and reasonably necessary for the proper trial of cases,13?
have adopted rules requiring a motion for a new trial to be reduced to
writing and to state specifically the grounds alleged therefor. How-
ever, the record herein did not contain the rules of the trial court be-
low, and the supreme court refused, following precedent,1' to take
judicial notice of them and assumed that the defendant's motion had
originally been filed within the rules prescribed by the trial court.
135. TErNN. CODE ANN. § 27-201 (1956).
136. 352 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1961).
137. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-514 (1956).
138. Brewer v. State, 187 Tenn. 396, 215 S.W.2d 798 (1948).
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There being no statutory requirement that one at the time he moves
for -a new trial do so in writing and state his grounds therefor, the
court overruled the state's motion.
In Neely v. State'3 9 the state likewise moved to dismiss the appeal
therein from a judgment of conviction, contending that the defendant
had not met the requirement of section 27-201 that a motion for new
trial be filed within thirty days of the verdict. From the minute entries
of the trial court as they appeared in the record on appeal, the
supreme court determined that the verdict in the case had been re-
corded on May 5, 1960, with a statement immediately following that
"thereupon the Defendant through his counsel of record, moves the
Court for a new trial herein, which motion is set for hearing on June
17, 1960," but that no judgment had at that time been entered on the
verdict; that the hearing had been reset for, and held on October 21,
1960, on which date the motion had been overuled and judgment
entered on the verdict; and that the defendant had filed on October
21, 1960, a bill of exceptions incorporating his motion for a new trial.
From this, the state argued that the defendant's motion had not been
filed until October 21, 1960, or 168 days after entry of the verdict,
whereas under section 27-201 the motion should have been filed within
thirty days from entry of the verdict.
The supreme court in Neely rejected the state's contention in this
regard and overruled its motion to dismiss the appeal. The court
pointed out that code section 27-312140 (enacted prior to the enact-
ment of section 27-201), making judgments final if no motion for a
new trial is filed within thirty days from their entry, had been con-
strued not to apply to a verdict alone without a judgment' 4' and that
thereunder "the losing party is not required to enter his motion for a
new trial until after a judgment is entered.' 42 Construing them to-
gether, the court held that the intent of section 27-201 was to conform
to, rather than to change, the well-established practice under section
27-312 that if a judgment is not entered when the verdict is recorded
the losing party may wait until after entry of the judgment and file his
motion for a new trial within thirty days following such entry. At any
rate, the court seems to have concluded, since section 27-201 says that
a motion for a new trial can only be applied for "within thirty (30)
days from the decree, verdict or judgment143 sought to be affected," the
motion which the defendant in the instant case incorporated in the bill
of exceptions on October 21, 1960, the day that the judgment was
entered, was filed in time under the statutory requirement.
139. 356 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. 1962).
140. TENN. CODE ANt. § 27-312 (1956).
141. Prince v. Lawson, 167 Tenn. 319, 321, 69 S.W.2d 889 (1934).
142. McCall v. State, 167 Tenn. 329, 333, 69 S.W.2d 892, 894 (1934).
143. TE . CODE ANN. § 27-201 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
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4. Penalties.-The relator in State ex. rel. Goss v. Bomar'" upon
conviction of the crime of burglary in the third degree had been given
a five year prison sentence and also a sentence of life imprisonment
as a habitual criminal. From a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, he appealed to the state supreme court, contending that the
habitual sentence was void because three separate prior convictions
are called for in the definition of a habitual criminal 145 in the Tennes-
see Habitual Criminal Act,'4 whereas the three prior convictions
upon which the habitual sentence against him was based had been
rendered on the same day, in the same court, and at the same term of
the court, and should therefore be considered for habitual criminal
purposes as only one conviction as a matter of law. The court, how-
ever, upon the determination that the relator had been convicted
of three different felonies occurring on three different dates, approved
the interpretation that it is not necessary for an application of habitual
criminal provisions under these circumstances that the defendant
should have been tried on separate days.147
In the Hardin'" case, based upon a single transaction, the defendant
had been convicted both for second degree murder for killing with
an automobile and for driving while under the influence of an in-
toxicant, and had been sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
ten years on the homicide charge and to a workhouse term of eleven
months and twenty-nine days and a ten dollar fine on the driving
while intoxicated charge. The supreme court ordered the judgment
modified so as to limit the conviction and sentence to the homicide
charge only, basing its decision on the principle that "two or more
separate offenses which are committed at the same time and are parts
144. 354 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1962).
145. "Any person who has either been three (3) times convicted within this state
of felonies, not less than two (2) of which are among those specified in §§ 39-604
[assault with intent to commit murder], 39-605 [assault with intent to commit rape],
39-609 [mayhem], 39-610 [malicious shooting or stabbing], 39-3708 [abduction of
female from parents or guardian] or 40-2712 [miscellaneous felonies, disfranchisement
by conviction of], or were for a crime punishable by death under existing law, but
for which the death penalty was not inflicted, or who has been three (3) times
convicted under the laws of any other state, government or country of crimes, not less
than two (2) of which, if they had been committed in this state, would have been
among those specified in said §§ 39-604, 39-605, 39-609, 39-610, 39-3708 or 40-2712,
or would have been punishable by death under existing laws, but for which the death
penalty was not inflicted, shall be considered, for the purposes of this chapter, and is
declared to be an habitual criminal, provided that petit larcency shall not be counted
as one of such three (3) convictions, but is expressly excluded; and provided, further,
that each of such three (3) convictions shall be for separate offenses, committed at
different times, and on separate occasions." TEN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 (1956).
146. TENN. CoDE ANN. tit. 40, ch. 28 (1956). See Note, Out of Sight, Out of
Mind: The Plight of the Habitual Criminal, 26 TENN. L. REv. 259 (1959).
147. 354 S.W.2d at 243, citing Canupp v. State, 197 Tenn. 56, 270 S.W.2d 356
(1954).
148. Hardin v. State, supra note 108.
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of a single continuing criminal act, inspired by the same criminal
intent, which is essential to each offense, are susceptible to but one
punishment," not to cumulative punishments. 49
149. Patmore v. State, 152 Tenn. 281, 285, 277 S.W. 892, 893 (1925).
